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External Authority: Compensation for Limited Statehood in the Provision of Collective 
Goods?
Luisa Linke-Behrens and Lisa van Hoof-Maurer
Abstract:
The vast majority of areas of limited statehood are subject to the authority of external actors, 
be it the IMF or regional organizations. These actors typically provide authority structures – 
institutions and rules – that are complementary or alternative to the state’s domestic authority 
structures. It is reasonable to assume that these external actors may either deliver collective 
goods directly, or the authority structures provided by them might work indirectly to that 
effect. In this paper, we systematically investigate whether external authority compensates 
for limited statehood with regard to collective goods provision. Our analysis shows that 
this is not the case. On the contrary, in fragile states with extremely limited or even absent 
statehood, the presence of external authority in domestic authority structures seems to have 
the opposite effect and is associated with poor collective goods provision.
Zusammenfassung:
Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit sind mehrheitlich der Autorität von externen Autoren 
ausgesetzt, beispielsweise dem IMF oder Regionalorganisationen. Diese Akteure stellen 
typischerweise Autoritätsstrukturen zur Verfügung – Institutionen und Regeln – die 
komplementär oder alternativ zu den innerstaatlichen Autoritätsstrukturen sind. Man kann 
davon ausgehen, dass entweder solche externe Akteure Kollektivgüter direkt bereitstellen 
oder dass ihre Autoritätsstrukturen dahingehend indirekt wirken. In diesem Paper 
untersuchen wir systematisch, inwiefern externe Autorität begrenzte Staatlichkeit in Bezug 
auf Kollektivgüterbereitstellung kompensieren kann. Unsere Analyse zeigt, dass dies nicht der 
Fall ist. Vielmehr scheint die Präsenz von externer Autorität in Staaten mit extrem begrenzter 
oder abwesender Staatlichkeit den gegenteiligen Effekt zu haben; hier ist sie mit schlechter 
Kollektivgüterbereitstellung assoziiert.
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1. Introduction
The vast majority of areas of limited statehood are subject to external authority. Many are 
constrained by loan conditionality of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World 
Bank, others are members of regional organizations with binding laws. Some are under the 
authority of peace and stabilization missions. In this context, external authority is understood 
as the legitimate constraint of a state’s freedom of action by an external actor. This actor then 
typically provides authority structures – institutions and rules – that are complementary or 
alternative to the state’s domestic authority structures. Think of the conditionality of the 
IMF with regard to loans to Argentina in the 2001 financial crisis. These loans were tied to 
comprehensive institutional reform and the adoption of specific legislation, severely restricting 
the Argentinian government’s room to maneuver compared to a situation in which it could 
pass legislation and reform – exercise authority over its territory – according to its own will. 
It is reasonable to assume that such external authority is positively associated with collective 
goods delivery: external actors with such authority may either deliver collective goods directly 
(cf. Matanock 2014), or the authority structures provided by them might work indirectly to that 
effect. In this paper, we systematically investigate this argument by asking: To what extent can 
external authority compensate for limited statehood with regard to collective goods provision? 
Our analysis shows that external authority cannot compensate for a lack of statehood when 
it comes to collective goods delivery. On the contrary, in fragile states with extremely limited 
or even absent statehood, the presence of external authority in domestic authority structures 
seems to have the opposite effect and is associated with poor collective goods provision. 
With this research we extend a prominent line of inquiry examining the relationship between 
statehood and authority on the one side and governance provision on the other. Whereas some 
claim that more services will be provided where the state is strong (Rotberg 2003, 2004, 2013), 
others oppose this view and suggest that governance can be provided even where the state is 
weak or absent (Beisheim et al. 2011; Risse 2011b, 2015). Much scholarly effort has been devoted 
to the analysis of functional equivalents that provide governance, especially external actors 
from the international and transnational realm (see for example Beisheim/Campe 2012; Börzel 
et al. 2012; Börzel/van Hüllen 2015; Krasner/Risse 2014b; Liese/Beisheim 2011; Schäferhoff 2011, 
2013). While we build on this body of work, we are specifically interested in those external actors 
that exercise authority and intrude into the authority structures of the target state. 
We identify three types of external authority that can meaningfully interfere with domestic 
authority structures: territorial intervention, legal authority of regional or international 
organizations, and conditionality. Interference by a UN-mandated mission, such as in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, is territorial in nature and therefore quite distinct from the 
non-territorial authorities of law and conditionality. Even though the latter are both concerned 
with interference, we contend that their quality is different and ought to be distinguished. These 
three categories form the basis of an original dataset of external authority. Our analysis relies 
in addition on comprehensive, country-level data for consolidated, weak, and fragile states for 
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the year 2008 including data on collective goods provision in five sectors (basic subsistence, 
education, infrastructure, public health, security) assembled by Lee et al. (2014). 
The argument develops in four steps. The next section starts by defining key concepts before 
presenting the theoretical links between authority and collective goods provision. Section three 
continues by describing operationalization and data sources, while section four demonstrates 
the results of the correlation analysis. We evaluate our findings and conclude in section five.
2. Conceptual Considerations 
In the following, we first define the main concepts: collective goods, statehood, and external 
authority. We then advance theoretical considerations on the relations between authority and 
collective goods provision. In distinguishing between statehood and external authority, we draw 
on the concept of sovereignty proposed by Stephen Krasner (1999, 2009). Domestic sovereignty 
and Westphalian sovereignty involve notions of internal and external authority, respectively. 
While we choose to refer directly to authority instead of taking a detour via sovereignty, Krasner’s 
work remains a conceptual reference point throughout the next paragraphs.
2.1 Definitions: Collective Goods, Statehood and External Authority
We understand collective goods – as opposed to private goods – as an immediate output of 
governance (cf. Draude et al. 2012). The latter is defined as “institutionalized modes of social 
coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective 
goods” (Draude et al. 2012; for similar definitions, see Mayntz 2004; Risse 2011a: 9; Schuppert/
Zürn 2008). This definition overcomes the implicit Western/Eurocentric bias of most 
governance definitions, which sharply distinguish between the private and public realms and 
equate statehood with modern consolidated nation-statehood. Accordingly, our definition is 
able to account for the blurred lines between private and public spheres in most non-OECD 
countries and takes into account governance independent from and beyond consolidated 
statehood (Draude 2012; Risse 2011a). 
(Political) authority is a form of power; more specifically it entails the constraint of A’s freedom 
of action by B. As opposed to coercion, authority implies that B is legitimized (authorized) to 
restrict the freedom of A (cf. Lake 2013; Simmons 2012). Such a conception of authority always 
contains a notion of hierarchical command, either within a given community (for example, a 
state) or in the international system. In the international realm, authority is derived from two 
main sources: law and social contract.1 Accordingly, one can distinguish two main forms of 
authority: formal-legal and relational authority (Lake 2009, 2013). With formal-legal authority, 
B earns the right to command all subordinates A by the lawful position it holds; in relational 
authority, B “provides a political order of value to […] [A] sufficient to offset the loss of freedom 
1 Lake draws on notions of sources of legitimate authority formulated by Weber (1978). Besides law 
and social contract, Weber mentions tradition and charismatic (leadership) as sources of legitimate 
authority.
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incurred in subordination” (Lake 2013: 59). Formal-legal authority, Lake (2013) claims, does 
not exist in international relations, as there is no law above states in an anarchical system. We 
argue, on the contrary, that there are instances of formal-legal authority where international 
institutions are able to exercise command over the subordinated states, such as regional 
organizations with binding law. Independent of its source, authority structures the behavior of 
individuals or states by providing the means to sanction non-compliance to given rules.
External authority, although widely used as a term in the discipline of International Relations, 
is only poorly theorized at a structural level. Most studies rely on agency-centered models, 
even if they claim to do otherwise (e.g., Lake/Fariss 2014). We understand external authority, as 
mentioned above, as a legitimate form of power: the legitimate constraint of the freedom of 
action of state A by external actor B. Actor B may offer authority structures complementary or 
alternative to A’s domestic authority structures; the operational basis of B is located outside of 
A. Three types of external authority seem relevant, as mentioned in the introduction: territorial 
interventions, legal authority, and conditionality. Whereas legal authority clearly relates only to 
formal-legal sources, territorial interventions and conditionality might derive authority from 
formal-legal as well as relational sources. If territorial interventions are mandated by the UN 
(Security Council) or a regional organization with supranational law, the associated authority 
derives from a legal source, but the interventions are of a relational nature if carried out without 
a formal mandate. The same differentiation can be made for conditionality. It might represent 
an instance of formal-legal authority in the case of lending conditionality by the IMF, but one 
of relational authority when large amounts of foreign currency are kept by a certain state, as this 
state might exert power over the owner of the currency.
Statehood relates to the formal organization of domestic authority structures and their 
effectiveness. Risse (2011a: 9) defines statehood as the ability to make and enforce central 
political decisions (Herrschaftsverband) and control over the means of violence (Gewaltenmonopol). 
Statehood entails a notion of internal authority, namely of the state and its government 
institutions over its subjects, both in the relational and the formal-legal sense. Territorial, 
sectoral, social, and temporal areas where the state’s ability to rule is restricted are called areas 
of limited statehood (Risse 2011a: 4-5). 
2.2 How Statehood and External Authority Relate to Collective Goods Provision
The relationship between statehood and external authority on the one side and governance and 
collective goods provision on the other remains under-researched from a theoretical perspective. 
However, there are three classical arguments on why and when the state provides collective goods 
for its citizens (cf. Lee et al. 2014: 2-3): Social contract theory holds that individuals cede certain 
rights to the state in exchange for the provision of collective goods, notably collective security 
(Boucher/Kelly 1994; Hobbes 1651/1955). Welfare economists argue that the state should provide 
goods that suffer from market failure (Samuelson 1954). Finally, in a functionalist argument on 
output legitimacy, the ruled people offers legitimacy and compliance to the ruling state if the 
state delivers a socio-political order acceptable to the ruled (Lake 2009). Yet these arguments 
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assume that consolidated statehood is the necessary condition for collective goods provision, 
and therefore they cannot hold true in many non-OECD countries where statehood is severely 
limited: if state authorities do not possess a monopoly of force, they cannot establish public 
security; if they are unable to make and enforce rules, they may fail to extract the financial 
resources needed to provide collective goods. 
Alternative arguments challenge this assumption of linearity and suggest that low levels of 
statehood do not necessarily relate to low levels of collective goods provision. They claim that 
effective governance provision mainly relies on a “shadow of hierarchy” (Börzel/Risse 2010; 
Risse 2011b, 2013b) and that “consolidated statehood is a prominent […] but not the only way to 
generate [such] a shadow’ (Risse 2013a: 89). So-called functional equivalents can compensate for 
limited statehood; one example is an external shadow of hierarchy, or external authority that 
provides alternative authority structures or complements existing domestic authority structures 
(cf. Krasner 2005: 7, on shared sovereignty). The effect on governance is two-fold: external actors 
with such authority may either directly deliver governance, in analogy to provision by a state, 
or external authority may work indirectly by providing alternative structures necessary for 
effective governance provision.
Different studies analyze ways in which external authority is used to improve public goods 
provision where the state is weak. Matanock (2014) has described the role of external authority 
in fostering and complementing existing domestic authority structures. Lake/Fariss (2014) 
have analyzed the effect of external alternative authority structures for neo-trusteeships as 
examples of a direct provision of collective goods by external actors using external authority. 
Other scholars have studied the indirect effect of external authority as described above (Börzel 
et al. 2012; Krasner/Risse 2014a; Schäferhoff 2011, 2013). These studies adopt an actor-centric 
perspective looking at actors commanding external authority, in contrast to this paper’s 
structural approach.
3. Operationalization and Data
This section discusses the operationalization, measurement, and data selection for each 
variable. But first, we wish to address one major criticism of nationally aggregated data, namely 
methodological nationalism (Zürn 2002). Such a dataset gives the false impression that the 
state or external authority is equally present throughout the whole territory and that the entire 
population benefits from equal levels of collective goods provision. At the same time, the analysis 
excludes political entities that are not internationally recognized. This is highly problematic, 
but no viable solution offers itself at this point; all that remains is to use the existing data while 
bearing in mind the implications at the later stage of the analysis. 
3.1 Collective Goods 
Given that the analysis uses the dataset provided by Lee et al. (2014), the following explanations 
are rather short; please refer to the original source for more details. Note that we measure the 
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output associated with collective goods, not the delivery itself, and we do not account for the 
actors who provided these goods. All data is categorized as high (marked green in table 1 below), 
medium (orange) and low (red). 
Basic subsistence is conceptualized as the percentage of the population with access to an 
improved water source, with data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2015). 
Education is operationalized as the average number of years of schooling that a child at the age 
of school entrance can expect to receive. We employ data from UNESCO (2015). Infrastructure 
is proxied by electricity rate: that is, the proportion of the population with electricity access at 
the household level. We use World Energy Outlook data from the International Energy Agency 
(International Energy Agency 2011). Public Health is measured by the maternal mortality rate, 
defined as the number of deaths of mothers during pregnancy or within the first 42 days after 
giving birth. Data comes from the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics 
and Evaluation (Hogan et al. 2010). We understand security as citizen-centric security, and it is 
measured by the absence of violence leading to death, including one-sided violence by the state 
or non-state organized groups against private individuals, violence by private individuals against 
other individuals (homicide), between the state and organized non-state groups (internal armed 
conflict), and between non-state organized groups. Data is compiled from Schröder and the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Project (Eck/Hultman 2007; Eck et al. 2010; Schröder 2010; UCDP 2011).
3.2 External Authority and Statehood
Given that formal-legal authority is more institutionalized than relational authority, it is 
possible to measure it much more precisely than its relational counterpart. We therefore focus 
on formal-legal authority in the following operationalization of external authority and its three 
dimensions without meaning to diminish the importance of relational authority.
Territorial interventions cover physical coercion and non-military interventions. This includes 
inter-state wars and bi- or multilateral interventions with a legal basis, such as military 
interventions by regional organizations, UN political operations, coalitions of states with 
a UN mandate, and peace-keeping missions either led by the UN or regional organizations 
or conducted by a group of states with a mandate from the UN Security Council. Note that 
observation missions are not part of this category, and only operations with more than 100 staff 
members are coded. Although this demarcation line seems arbitrary, we need to account for 
larger missions in command of larger resources, which has been mentioned in the literature 
(Krasner/Risse 2014a) as an important factor of success. Data is derived from the SIPRI Yearbook 
2009 and the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (Harbom/Wallenstein 2009; Soder 
2009). 
Legal authority is commanded by international or regional organizations with binding 
supranational law and the possibility to enforce it, for example by means of a supranational 
court issuing rulings that are binding for all member states. Note that this provision does not 
require the supremacy of supranational law over national laws, such as in the EU. We have coded 
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original data on legal authority. The dataset includes members of the EU, ECOWAS, the South 
African Development Community (SADC), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the 
Andean Community (CAN) (CAN 2011a, 2011b; CARICOM Secretariat 2011; CCJ 2012; ECOWAS 
Commission 2007; European Commission 2012; SADC 2012).
Conditionality includes legal conditionality – sanctions and rewards with a legal basis such as 
membership conditionality in the EU – and lending/economic conditionality, most importantly 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. Data comes from progress reports 
of the European Commission of 2009 (European Commission 2009), the IMF’s Monitoring of 
Fund Arrangements Database (MONA) (IMF 2014), and the World Bank lending database (World 
Bank 2014).
Statehood is operationalized as control over the legitimate means of violence and the ability 
to make and enforce collectively binding decisions. We categorize all states in one of three 
groups: consolidated, weak, and fragile states. This builds on a scale developed by Börzel/Risse 
(2013: 71), but we replace their label “areas of limited statehood” with “weak states.”2 Risse (2011a) 
has himself argued that areas of limited statehood can also exist within consolidated states, 
and using the term with reference to both fragile and consolidated states therefore seems 
conceptually imprecise. Data for the monopoly of force is composed of the degree to which the 
state can effectively maintain authoritative order (MAGFAIL) and the proportion of a country 
affected by revolutionary protest and fighting (MAGAREA); these measures are derived from 
the Political Instability Task Force Database of the Center of Global Policy at George Mason 
University (Lee et al. 2014: 5). The ability to make and enforce collectively binding decisions 
is proxied by the ability to extract resources for the purpose of producing public goods and 
services, that is, extractive capacity. Data is derived from the Institutional Profile Database of the 
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (cf. Lee et al. 2014). 
The sample comprises 122 states in the year 2008. We mapped the governance performance of 
all states in tables – a table for each collective good – with levels of statehood in columns, and 
types of external authority in rows. The different levels of governance are indicated through 
colors: green for high governance provision, orange for medium, and red for low.
4. External Authority: Compensation for Limited Statehood?
Before discussing collective goods provision in light of external authority and statehood, it is 
worth looking at the distribution of external authority and statehood on their own (see table 1). 
Overall, about five in six states are constrained by external authority. However, the presence of 
external authority in domestic structures is more common among weak and fragile states than 
among consolidated states. Roughly two in three fragile and weak states are subject to some 
kind of external authority. The few exceptions include most Gulf states such as Qatar, Bahrain, 
2 Note that we excluded the fourth category of the original scale, failed states, due to the small sample 
size.
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Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, together with Israel, Libya and Russia. In 
other words, weak or fragile states that are not bound by external authority are the exception. 
The ratio is much lower among consolidated states, of which only about half are bound by 
external authority. 
Table 1: Statehood, external authority, and health
Statehood
Low: Fragile States Med: Weak States High: consolidated States
Ty
pe
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
N
o
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Bahrain 
Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia
Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Cuba, Japan, South Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, 
Oman, Singapore, 
Switzerland, US
C
on
di
tio
na
lit
y
Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Yemen, Guatemala
Algeria, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Cameroon, China, 
Congo, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Gabon, 
Ghana, Honduras, India, 
Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritania, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Serbia, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Vietnam
Le
ga
l
Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Sudan
Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Greece, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Peru, 
Portugal, Romania, Senegal, 
Togo, Zambia
Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK
Te
rr
ito
ri
al Central African Republic, 
Chad, Côte d‘Ivoire, DRC, 
Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria
Cyprus, Haiti 
Almost half of all states are situated in the middle of the table: they are weak states and subject 
to either conditionality or legal authority or both. There are very few weak states in the lowest 
row; in other words, territorial interventions in weak states seem to occur only rarely. Fragile 
states are, with the exceptions mentioned earlier, equally affected by all three types of external 
authority with a slight tendency toward conditionality. Finally, there are virtually no consolidated 
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states bound only by conditionality or with a territorial intervention on their territory. Most 
consolidated states are under the legal authority of a regional organization – these are, above all, 
the members of the European Union – while the rest is subject to no external authority. 
If indeed external authority could compensate for limited statehood, what would we expect 
in terms of the distribution of collective goods provision? We would think that fragile states 
with no interference by external authority perform worse than fragile states that are subject 
to external authority, especially territorial interventions. We would see red and orange in the 
upper cell of the column for fragile states in table 1, and green and orange in the lower cells, or 
at least a mix of colors throughout the column. The same would be true for weak states. 
Table 1 above demonstrates the results for public health; the tables for security, education, basic 
subsistence and infrastructure can be found in the annex. A look at these tables reveals that 
none of the above expectations seem to be the case. In fact, we see an entirely different pattern. 
First, collective goods provision is better in states that are not subject to any external authority, 
regardless of the level of statehood. This is observable in the area of health and in all other sectors. 
Second, fragile states subject to territorial interventions or legal authority perform weakly in 
the provision of governance, again throughout all sectors. Conditionality is related to mixed 
governance performance in fragile states. For example, public health performance is equally 
insufficient in Nigeria – subject to the legal authority of ECOWAS – as in the Central African 
Republic, which is host to the Multidimensional Stabilization Mission. Third, in weak states, 
where state authorities remain at least partially in control, no clear connection is discernible 
between the type of external authority and the level of collective goods delivery. Well-performing 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, or Portugal can be found in either category of external 
authority. Likewise, poorly performing states such as Cameroon, Mauretania, Mali, or Niger are 
situated in both categories. Health performance is equally good in Russia, which is subject to 
no external authority, as in Peru, a member of the Andean Community with binding regional 
law; it is equally bad in Cameroon, bound to conditionality by the IMF, as in Zambia, member of 
SADC and subject to its legal authority. Lastly, different types of territorial intervention seem to 
make a difference: countries with a peace-keeping mission in place such as Lebanon or Cyprus 
perform much better across sectors than countries with military missions on their territory. 
This includes the Central African Republic or Chad, whose governance performance is low in 
all sectors.
5. Evaluation and Conclusion 
Our analysis demonstrates that external authority does not necessarily improve governance 
provision in areas of limited statehood. It seems that external authority cannot compensate for 
limited statehood when it comes to the provision of collective goods and services, quite contrary 
to our initial expectation. External authority does not seem to be systematically associated with 
high levels of collective goods provision. In fact, collective goods provision is better in states 
that are not subject to any external authority, regardless of the level of statehood. This trend is 
most clearly the case in fragile states, where all types of external authority are associated with 
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lower levels of collective goods provision; in weak states, this is not as markedly visible. In 
other words, neither statehood nor external authority is as directly related to collective goods 
provision as commonly assumed.
Two explanations might explain these results. First, the shadow of external authority might 
not be sufficiently strong to have a large-scale effect on collective goods provision. In this case, 
the authority structures provided by external actors are either not functional or not utilized to 
improve collective goods provision. Second, the external actors in possession of authority might 
not provide collective goods on a scale that would be visible in macro data. These explanations 
can work independent of each other or can function simultaneously; in any case, the authority 
exercised by these external actors does not seem to make a difference when it comes to collective 
goods provision.
The findings of this analysis are interesting in themselves, but they invite a host of open questions. 
In addition, they should be considered with an awareness of the empirical shortcomings. To offset 
these deficiencies and to assess the proposed relations between external authority, statehood, 
and collective goods provision in more depth, we suggest the following case study approaches: 
A first idea is to investigate the qualitative differences of the various types of external authority 
as proposed above. Holding the levels of statehood constant at a low level, this type of study 
could compare fragile states subject to external authority in terms of the reasons for submitting 
to such authority, the character of such authority, and finally, the (non)effects of that authority 
on collective goods provision. An additional perspective would be offered by a comparison of 
states subject to the same type of external authority with different levels of statehood. What are 
the relations to governance performance? Once again, are there different rationalities for the 
subordination to external authority? What are the relations between statehood and external 
authority? A third interesting topic is the group of consolidated states that are not bound by 
any kind of external authority. Aside from economic wealth, what are the reasons for this status? 
What role do notions of sovereignty and autonomy play? And finally, it would be worthwhile to 
look more closely at the difference in collective goods provision between countries subject to 
peace-keeping missions and those subject to military interventions.
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Annex
Table 2: Statehood, external authority, and security
Statehood
Low: Fragile States Med: Weak States High: consolidated States
Ty
pe
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
N
o
Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrain
Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela
Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Cuba, Japan, South Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, 
Oman, Singapore, 
Switzerland, US
C
on
di
tio
na
lit
y
Laos, Guatemala, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Yemen
Algeria, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Cameroon, China, 
Congo, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Gabon, 
Ghana, India, Iran, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mauritania, 
Mexico, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam
Le
ga
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
 
(o
r:
 le
ga
l +
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on
d.
)
Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
Sudan,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Niger, Peru, Portugal, 
Romania, Senegal, Togo, 
Zambia
Austria, Bahrain, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK
Te
rr
ito
ri
al
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n Central African Republic, 
Chad, Côte d‘Ivoire, DRC, 
Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria
Cyprus, Haiti 
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Table 3: Statehood, external authority, and basic subsistence
Statehood
Low: Fragile States Med: Weak States High: consolidated States
Ty
pe
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
N
o
Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates
Israel, Kuwait, Russia Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Cuba, Japan, South Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, 
Oman, Singapore, 
Switzerland, US
C
on
di
tio
na
lit
y
Cambodia, Guatemala, 
Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Yemen
Algeria, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Cameroon, China, 
Congo, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Gabon, 
Ghana, Honduras, India, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mauritania, 
Mexico, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Serbia, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uganda, Uruguay, Vietnam
Le
ga
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
 
(o
r:
 le
ga
l +
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on
d.
)
Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
Sudan
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Peru, 
Portugal, Senegal, Togo, 
Zambia
Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK
Te
rr
ito
ri
al
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n Central African Republic, 
Chad, Côte d‘Ivoire, DRC, 
Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria
Cyprus, Haiti 
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Table 4: Statehood, external authority, and infrastructure
Statehood
Low: Fragile States Med: Weak States High: consolidated States
Ty
pe
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
N
o
Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrain
Israel, Kuwait, Russia, 
Libya, Saudi-Arabia, 
Venezuela
Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Cuba, Japan, South Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, 
Oman, Singapore, 
Switzerland, US
C
on
di
tio
na
lit
y
Cambodia, Guatemala, 
Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Yemen
Algeria, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Cameroon, China, 
Congo, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Gabon, 
Ghana, Honduras, India, 
Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Serbia, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Vietnam
Le
ga
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
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r:
 le
ga
l +
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on
d.
)
Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
Sudan
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Colombia, Ecuador, 
Greece, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Peru, Portugal, 
Romania, Senegal, Togo, 
Zambia
Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, UK
Te
rr
ito
ri
al
 
in
te
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tio
n Côte d‘Ivoire, DRC, 
Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria
Haiti 
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Table 5: Statehood, external authority, and education
Statehood
Low: Fragile States Med: Weak States High: consolidated States
Ty
pe
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
N
o
Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrain
Israel, Kuwait, Russia, 
Libya, Saudi-Arabia, 
Venezuela
Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Cuba, Japan, South Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, 
Oman, Singapore, 
Switzerland, US
C
on
di
tio
na
lit
y
Cambodia, Guatemala, 
Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, 
Yemen
Algeria, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Cameroon, China, 
Congo, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Gabon, 
Ghana, Honduras, India, 
Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Malaysia, 
Mauretania, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Serbia, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Vietnam
Le
ga
l a
ut
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)
Angola, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
Sudan
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Peru, 
Portugal,  Romania, 
Senegal, Togo, Zambia
Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, UK
Te
rr
ito
ri
al
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n Central African Republic, 
Chad, Côte d‘Ivoire, DRC, 
Ethiopia, Lebanon, Syria
Cyprus, Haiti
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